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In “The Status of Content” (hereafter, SOC),^ I proposed a particular 
way of formulating the thesis of content eliminativism—namely, as 
consisting in a thesis I called content irrealism. And I then proceeded to 
argue that, so formulated, content eliminativism is unstable. Since I took 
content irrealism to represent not only the traditional way, but also the 
most promising way known to me, of formulating the thesis of content 
eliminativism, I concluded that there was a prima facie difficulty with the 
coherence of content eliminativism. If I may be allowed to quote myself, 
I said:
. . .  at least as traditionally formulated, an irrealism about content is not merely im­
plausible, it is incoherent. The present paper is intended as a challenge, to those who wish 
to propound such an irrealism, to formulate their view in a manner that is not subject to the 
difficulties it raises, (p. 158)
In “Transcendentalism About Content, Michael Devitt presents a 
characteristically brisk critique of my paper. He expresses his main claim 
as follows:
I aim to show that all arguments to this effect are bad by laying bare the question-begging 
strategy that is common to them. (p. 247)
Unfortunately, his claims are based upon a serious misunderstanding of 
the argument of my paper. His most serious confusion can be succinctly 
stated: He thinks that content irrealism, as I  defined it, is a thesis that is 
distinct from, and an optional elaboration upon, an antecedently 
articulated thesis o f content eliminativism, rather than an expression o f 
it. This causes havoc throughout his paper. Indeed, with a single 
exception to be discussed later, all his principal criticisms are based, and 
depend, upon this one simple mistake.
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My aim in this paper is to argue a very narrow case: that Devitt’s 
arguments don’t show how to answer the challenge I laid down in SOC.^ 
I proceed as follows. I begin by looking at why I didn’t formulate content 
eliminativism in the way that Devitt does, and why I did formulate it as 
the thesis of “content irrealism.” I then show in detail why his criticisms 
are off-target.
/. Eliminativism and Irrealism
In SOC, I understood an ‘eliminativism about P’s’ to consist in either 
one of the following theses:
(Error): The predicate ‘is P ’ denotes a property that nothing has.
Or,
(Non-factualism): The predicate ‘is P ’ does not denote any property.
Why define it so? Why not define it purely objectually in the manner 
Devitt evidently favors:
(Objectual Eliminativism): There are no P ’s.
We may all agree that an ‘eliminativism about P ’s’ is the view that 
nothing is P. But as the slightest knowledge of the history of the subject 
will reveal, philosophers have held that there are two importantly dif­
ferent ways in which it might transpire that there are no P ’s. One way is 
this: there is a property of being P, but nothing has it. There are no P’s 
because nothing instantiates the property of being P. One might take 
such a view about witches: there are no witches in the sense that nothing 
has the property of being a witch.
But another—historically very influential—way in which philosophers 
have wished to deny that there are P-facts is not by asserting that there is 
a property—P-ness—that nothing has, but rather by claiming something 
that might get expressed as follows: there is no such property as that of 
being P.
Thus, a moral non-cognitivist is an eliminativist about moral facts— 
not because he thinks that there are moral properties that nothing has, 
but because he thinks that there are no motal properties. Kripke’s 
Wittgenstein is an eliminativist about semantic facts—not because he 
thinks that there are semantic properties that nothing has, but because 
he thinks that there are no semantic properties. And so on.
The problem for a purely objectual statement of eliminativism, how­
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ever, is that this important second sense in which one might be an 
eliminativist about P ’s does not appear to be coherently expressible as an 
objectual thesis. For how would it go? One might try:
There is no such property as that of being P.
But it is hard to see how this is to be read as saying anything other than:
The property of being P is such that there isn’t such a property.
And that couldn’t be true.
The trouble is that the property whose existence (not whose instantia­
tion) is being denied must be specified, if the claim is to be formulated at 
all; and yet not in terms that presuppose its existence. And I cannot see 
what coherent thought that is to be, if not a metalinguistic one. Namely, 
this:
The predicate ‘is P ’ does not refer to a property.^
This suggests that the root idea behind an ‘eliminativism about P ’s’ is 
really a thought of this form: No real properties answer to our use of the 
predicate ‘is P .’ And this thought itself seems expressible in the two ways 
that the (Error) and (Non-factualism) theses specify.
Exploiting familiar principles connecting reference and truth, we may 
write (Error) as:
(3) ‘x is P ’ is always false^ 
and (Non-factualism) as:
(1) The predicate ‘is P ’ does not refer to a property 
and (hence)
(2) ‘x is P ’ does not express a truth condition.^
In SOC, I went on to point out that whereas (Non-factualism) would 
express an intelligible proposition only on robust readings of “truth- 
condition” and “refer,” (3)—the general (Error) thesis—would express 
an intelligible proposition on either a robust or a deflationary conception 
of “fa lse .S ince  on a deflationary conception of “truth condition” and 
“refer,” any declarative sentence is automatically truth-conditional, and 
any predicate automatically referential, (1) and (2) will always come out
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false on a deflationary reading. This is not true, however, for (3): (3) will 
yield distinct, apparently intelligible propositions, for each of the two 
possible readings of the truth (or falsity) predicate. Let’s give them 
labels:
(3A) ‘x is P ’ is robustly false 
and
(3B) ‘x is P ’ is deflationarily false.
Notice: Not only do (3A) and (3B) both appear to express intelligible 
propositions, they both appear to express intelligible propositions that 
are relevant to articulating the root thought behind ‘eliminativism’ (as 
I have explained it). In particular, since a deflationary falsity predicate is 
just a device for semantic ascent—a point stressed both by me and Devitt 
—(3B) just is the purely objectual proposition that no x is P. So the 
relation between the ‘eliminativism’ that I define and the ‘eliminativism’ 
that Devitt defines—as consisting, namely, solely in (Objectual Elimin­
ativism)—is that my definition subsumes his as part of a larger and fuller 
picture of the ideas that have been important in this area.
Aware of the fact that some people so regiment the term “elimin­
ativism” that it is reserved for views that have purely objectual formula­
tions, I decided in SOC to call the overall view defined by (Error) and 
(Non-factualism) “irrealism,” rather than “eliminativism.” This was a 
purely terminological decision. It was certainly not meant to suggest that 
irrealism is a thesis distinct from, and a further elaboration upon, an 
antecedently formulated ‘eliminativism.’ This should have been obvious 
from the first sentence of the paper, which Devitt cites:
An irrealist conception of a given region of discourse is the view that no real properties 
answer to the central predicates of the region in question, (p. 157)
Applied to the special case of an ‘eliminativism about truth-conditional 
content,’ the irrealist recipes above yield one or another of the following 
views. Either,
(Content Error): The predicate ‘has truth condition p’ refers to a
property that nothing has.
Or,
(Content Non-factualism): The predicate ‘has truth condition p’ does 
not refer to any property.
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Exploiting familiar principles connecting reference and truth, we may 
write the first thesis as:
(4) All sentences of the form ‘S has truth condition p’ are false.
And the second as:
(5) The predicate ‘has truth condition p’ does not refer to a property 
and
(6) ‘S has truth condition p’ is not truth-conditional.
And that is in fact the way I formulated content ‘eliminativism’ in SOC.
It is also the way many of the most prominent proponents of content 
eliminativism formulate their view—a fact that is amply documented in 
SOC and conveniently ignored by Devitt. Thus, to cite just four 
examples:
Paul Churchland:
our common sense psychological framework is a false and radically misleading conception 
of the causes of human behavior and cognitive activity.®
And Kripke (on behalf of Wittgenstein):
Wittgenstein’s sceptical solution concedes to the sceptic that no ‘truth conditions’ or 
‘corresponding facts’ in the world exist that make a statement like “Jones . . . means 
addition by ‘ ” true.^
And Stephen Stich:
The predicate ‘is a belief that p’ does not express or correspond to a property.
And Ayer:
our analysis has shown that the word ‘true’ does not stand for anything.*^
As these passages further reveal, the sort of content eliminativism that 
‘denies the existence of content properties’ has been extremely influential 
in the history of the subject. And it is invariably expressed by its own 
proponents as I have argued it probably has to be: as a metalinguistic 
thesis. That is why I formulated eliminativism in general, and content 
eliminativism in particular, in the way that I did, and not in the manner 
of Devitt’s terse purely objectual definition:
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(OCE) An eliminativist about truth-conditional content denies that 
anything has a content explained in terms of truth and reference, 
(p. 247)
To make matters as explicit as possible, let us now list the three 
versions of content irrealism that are on the table. Bearing in mind that 
an eliminativist about truth-conditional content is an eliminativist about 
robust-truth-conditional content only,^^ and that there are two versions 
of the error thesis and only one of non-factualism, we get this:
(CNF, for content non-factualism): The predicate ‘has robust-truth 
condition p’ does not robustly-refer to a property; and the sentence ‘S 
has robust-truth condition p’ is not robustly-truth-conditional.
(RCE, for robust content error): ‘S has robust-truth condition p’ is 
always robustly-false.
(DCE, for deflationary content error): ‘S has robust-truth condition p’ 
is always deflationary-false.^^
The purely objectualist view (OCE) is, of course, represented in this 
scheme by (DCE). So nothing would appear to have been left out.
II. A Central Confusion
Now in SOC, I went on to argue that none of these possible expressions 
of an irrealism about content appeared to express a stable proposition. 
Hence, there appears to be a prima facie difficulty with its coherence.
Devitt claims to find fault with my arguments. Here is what he does. 
First, he simply assumes at the outset that the only thesis that could 
legitimately be called an ‘eliminativism about content’ is the purely 
objectual thesis (OCE). Armed with this assumption, he fishes around 
for something else that my content irrealist theses might be taken to 
express. He decides that they must be expressions of “defect” theses— 
theses about a given sentence expressing the claim that it does not some­
how meet our highest evaluative standards (see p. 251). Having arrived 
at this interpretation—in the teeth of what my paper actually says and 
of how eliminativists themselves formulate their views—he argues as 
follows.
First, it is true that (CNF) expresses an unstable proposition; but no 
content eliminativist would have anything to do with (CNF), for no 
content eliminativist would use (CNF) to express a “defect” thesis about 
the sentence ‘S has robust-truth condition p.’ So it is entirely question­
begging to saddle her with (CNF).
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Second, it is true that (RCE) expresses an unstable proposition; but no 
content eliminativist would have anything to do with (RCE), for no 
content eliminativist would use (RCE) to express a “defect” thesis about 
the sentence ‘S has robust-truth condition p.’ So it is entirely question­
begging to saddle her with (RCE).
Third, there is nothing unstable with (DCE) and moreover no reason 
why a content eliminativist couldn’t accept it: after all, it is just equiv­
alent to her eliminativism. However, it is still wrong to suggest that she 
would use it to formulate a “defect” thesis about any sentence, for it is in 
general wrong to use a deflationary notion of falsity to formulate an 
error thesis about anything.
His arguments suffer from several problems.
First, my theses are not intended to be “defect” theses, formulated 
against the background of an antecedently stated content eliminativism, 
but rather formulations o f the various distinct possible propositions that 
an eliminativism about content might amount to. My strategy in SOC 
was to show that each of these possible formulations of eliminativism is 
unstable; and to challenge the eliminativist to formulate her position in a 
way that doesn’t commit her to them. Insofar, then, as Devitt concedes 
that two of these propositions are unstable, he concedes the only claim 
I ever made about them: that those particular avenues for expressing 
content eliminativism are closed. Insofar as he accuses me of inappro­
priately saddling the eliminativist with these theses as addenda to her 
eliminativism, he misinterprets me. Hence, his master charge—that my 
paper proceeds by saddling the eliminativist with theses that are 
“question-begging”—fails completely. It rests in its entirety on his failure 
to realize that the irrealist theses I defined are meant to be versions of 
eliminativism, not addenda to it. This failure constitutes his master 
confusion.
Second, Devitt’s claim that my willingness to contemplate a deflation­
ary reading of the (Error) thesis betrays a serious mishandling of defla­
tionary truth, is based on the same misunderstanding. Since the (Error) 
thesis is not meant to be an expression of a “defect” thesis, but rather a 
version of eliminativism itself, and since the deflationary version of 
(Error) expresses a recognizably eliminativist thought (indeed the very 
thought that Devitt himself isolates as solely definitive of eliminativism), 
there would appear to be no mistake in my willingness to include it. On 
the contrary, I would have been delinquent to omit it.
Finally, he fails to appreciate that the argument against the coherence 
of (CNF)—which he concedes—already suffices to show the instability 
of (DCE) and, hence, of objectual content eliminativism itself.
I now turn to arguing for each of these claims in detail.
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///. DevitVs Discussion o f the Robust Error Thesis
Devitt grants my claim that the thesis expressed by (RCE) is unstable. He 
argues, however, that it is in fact “naively” and “blatantly question­
begging” to suppose that the content eliminativist is committed to it. 
Hence, my claim that its instability weighs against content eliminativism 
fails.
Why does Devitt think that it is “question-begging” to suppose that 
the eliminativist is committed-to (RCE)? This is puzzling, is it not? 
(RCE) is supposed to be a statement of content eliminativism. How can 
the statement of a position beg its own question?
The answer is the master confusion: Devitt doesn’t see that (RCE) is 
supposed to be a statement of eliminativism at all. Instead, he takes it to 
be a way of formulating a “defect” thesis about a sentence, framed 
against the background of an antecedently stated purely objectual elim­
inativist thesis. This comes through very clearly in the following passages:
The error thesis is a . . . semantic level doctrine made necessary by eliminativism at the 
metaphysical level. . . . The thesis is supposed to give us explanatorily significant in­
formation about sentencesy not simply to restate eliminativism. (p. 254)
And:
The essence of the error thesis about some sentences is that those sentences are open to 
criticism for not meeting our evaluative standards: they have a property that our “best” 
sentences don’t; they are different from, say, the sentences of our most respected sciences. 
What defect we attribute to the sentences will depend on our semantics. If our semantics is 
truth-conditional, the defect in the sentences is obviously that they are false, as (3) says. If 
the semantics is the alternative one that the eliminativist must supply anyway, the defect 
will be something equally obvious. . . . (pp. 251-252, emphases in original.)
On the basis of this simple oversight, he proceeds to convict me of 
begging the eliminativist’s question by saddling her with (RCE). Armed 
with his fallacious assumption this is, of course, a very easy thing to do.
Why shouldn’t we say that a content eliminativist—read, a proponent 
of (OCE)—will formulate her “defect” thesis about the sentence ‘S has 
robust-truth condition p’ as the view that:
(RCE) ‘S has robust-truth condition p’ is always robustly-false?
Easy. For as Devitt is reading it, “content eliminativism” has been ante­
cedently defined to consist solely in the objectual view: Nothing is robustly 
true or false. And, of course, nobody who already holds that view would 
say—in the course of formulating a “defect” thesis, or anything else for
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that matter—that the sentence ‘S has truth condition p’ is robustly false!
What this overlooks is that I was taking (RCE) to be a version of 
eliminativism itself, not a statement of a “defect” thesis additional to an 
antecedently formulated thesis of content eliminativism. It is not sup­
posed to be the only version; it is not even supposed to be the most 
promising version. Just a version, suggested by the general recipe for 
formulating the root through behind any eliminativist conviction what­
ever. And Devitt’s concession that it is unstable concedes to me the only 
claim I ever made about it: namely, that at least this avenue for express­
ing content eliminativism is closed.
IV. DevitVs Discussion o f the Non~Factualist Thesis
Similar problems attend Devitt’s discussion of my “non-factualist” 
variant. I defined a non-factualism about the sentence ‘x is P ’ to consist 
in (1) and (2) above. Devitt concedes my claim that this view, applied to 
the case of content ascriptions—yielding, as we have seen, (CNF)— 
delivers an unstable proposition:
Boghossian argues that this account presupposes a robust notion of truth. On the strength 
of this, he is quickly able, not surprisingly, to convict the non-factualist about content 
ascriptions of “contradiction”. . . .
However, this result is irrelevant, according to Devitt, because this 
account
is unsuitable for an eliminativist about content. Boghossian is saddling the eliminativist 
with precisely what she denies, (p. 258)
Why is this account unsuitable for an eliminativist about content? Devitt 
patiently explains:
Non-factualism about certain sentences is the view that those sentences have a different sort 
of meaning from the standard meaning of “factual” sentences, particularly the sentences of 
science. That is what is constitutive of non-factualism. Now, it is clear that a person whose 
standard semantics is truth-conditional will go on to identify non-factualism about 
sentences with the rejection of truth-conditional semantics for those sentences; he can go 
along with (1) and (2). But, it should be equally clear that a person who rejects truth- 
conditional semantics altogether, and has a different standard semantics, will not accept (1) 
and (2) as an account of non-factualism. (p. 258)
The master confusion again: Devitt is assuming that the thesis I called 
“non-factualism” is supposed to be a “defect” thesis framed against the 
background of an antecedently defined, eliminativist thesis, purely
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objectually formulated. This time he pronounces it to be the view that 
certain “sentences have a different sort of meaning from the standard 
meaning of ‘factual’ sentences, particularly the sentences of science. 
That is what is constitutive of non-factualism.” I, however, formulated 
(Non-factualism) to express a possible version of eliminativism itself—a 
version that, as we have seen, figures very prominently in the literature 
on the subject. And that is how I want it read.
On the basis of his misreading, he proceeds to convict me of begging 
the eliminativist’s question. Why shouldn’t we say that a content elim- 
inativist—read, a proponent of (OCE)—will formulate her “defect” 
thesis about the sentence ‘S has robust-truth condition p’ in terms of 
(CNF)? Easy. Since as Devitt understands it, a “non-factualism” about a 
sentence is supposed to express the idea that that sentence has a non­
standard semantics, and since a proponent of (OCE) holds that nothing 
has a robust truth condition, such a person will hardly want to use (1) 
and (2) to express “non-factualism, general, or (CNF) to express 
content non-factualism in particular. Given the misunderstanding, the 
point is quite right.
Again, however, the criticism misfires. As I have already explained, a 
non-factualism about ‘x is P ’ is not supposed to be the view that ‘x is P ’ 
has a different meaning from the meaning of the sentences of science, 
but is supposed to be a statement—indeed, even a traditional statement— 
of an important version of eliminativism about P ’s. In application to 
every other subject matter, it appears to yield a possible—not to say, 
plausible—view. In application to content ascriptions, I argued that it 
does not yield a possible view: (CNF) is intrinsically unstable. Devitt 
accepts this claim. He thereby concedes the only claim I ever made about 
it: that this—as we have seen very common—avenue for expressing 
content eliminativism is also closed. This strikes me as a very significant 
result.
V. Devitt Discussion of Deflationary Truth
Devitt repeatedly complains about what he takes to be my misuse of a 
deflationary conception of truth:
Deflationary truth plays a major role in Boghossian’s discussion of both the non-factualist 
thesis and the error thesis. . . . [But] deflationary truth has no place in the eliminativist’s 
account of either form of irrealism. So deflationary truth is'doubly irrelevant. . . . (p. 252)
What we cannot go along with is what Boghossian does with deflationary truth, (p. 253) 
Boghossian is seriously astray in his handling of deflationary truth, (p. 253)
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Again, however, the complaint rests on the simple confusion uncovered 
above, as we shall see.
Which claims of mine are the target of all this criticism? First, my 
claim that the general error thesis could be read with either a deflationary 
or a robust truth predicate. Second, my claim that the general non- 
factualist thesis could be read only with robust notions of truth and 
reference.
What has Devitt so upset is that he finds my second claim here obvious, 
and my first claim false. Why? The master confusion again: because 
he is assuming that my error and non-factualist theses are attempts to 
formulate “defect” theses about sentences on the basis of a previously 
accepted eliminativist thesis, rather than attempts to state eliminativism 
itself.
Thus, he instructs us in the proper understanding of the idea of de­
flationary truth, patiently explaining that on this conception the truth 
predicate is just a device for semantic ascent, not something that can be 
used to attribute a property to a sentence. What he says merely rehearses 
remarks that I had myself made in characterizing deflationary truth (see 
SOC, pp. 162-163); but it is presented mysteriously as if it were news.
Armed with this elementary exposition of deflationary truth, and the 
fallacious assumption that my error and non-factualist theses are meant 
to be “defect” theses, rather than statements of content eliminativism 
itself, he proceeds to complain:
the deflationary falsity term cannot give us any explanatorily significant information about 
a sentence. In particular, it cannot tell us what the error thesis must tell us: the nature of the 
defect a sentence suffers from. Saying, as (3) does, that ‘x is P ’ is always false is saying that 
no X is P. So it is simply a restatement of the metaphysical level doctrine eliminativism 
about P ’s. . . . [However] the thesis is supposed to give explanatorily significant informa­
tion about sentences, not simply to restate eliminativism (p. 254)
And:
Boghossian discusses the notions of truth and reference in (1) and (2) at great length. . . . 
He finds (1) and (2) hard to understand if their notions are merely deflationary. . . .  He 
concludes that the notions must be robust. . . But, o f course, they must be robust if they 
are to characterize non-factualism. Deflationary truth cannot explain anything about 
sentences, only robust truth can do that. (p. 259)
Unfortunately for Devitt, however, the criticism misfires, owing to a 
distinct lack of target. As the reader is no doubt tired of being reminded, 
the theses are not meant to express “defect” theses, but rather various 
possible versions of eliminativism itself. It would have been wrong to 
leave out the deflationary reading of the general error thesis. That would
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have been to leave out not only a traditionally important version of elim­
inati vism, but at the same time the only thesis that Devitt himself 
considers definitive of that view.
VI. The Argument Against the Deflationary Error Thesis
What, then, about the deflationary error thesis or, equivalently, Devitt’s 
objectual view: Nothing has a robust-truth-conditional or robust-refer­
ential property?
Let’s go back to the discussion of content non-factualism. This is the 
thesis that:
(CNF): The predicate ‘has robust truth-condition p’ does not robustly- 
refer to any property; and, the sentence ‘S has robust-truth condition 
p’ is not robustly-truth-conditional.
As the reader may recall, I argued in SOC—and Devitt concedes—that 
this thesis does not express a stable proposition. In fact, in SOC I went 
further and argued that neither conjunct by itself expresses a stable 
proposition. None of those claims is challenged by Devitt.
Now, Devitt is not disturbed by these results because he thinks that a 
content eliminativist is not committed to (CNF). And he thinks that a 
content eliminativist is not committed to (CNF) for two reasons: first, 
because he understands content eliminativism to consist solely in the 
purely objectual thesis (OCE); and because he understands (CNF) to be 
the view that content ascriptions are not like the sentences of science. 
And he argues, rightly, that no one who holds (OCE) will use (CNF) to 
express the view that content ascriptions are not like the sentences of 
science.
Let’s grant this. Let’s grant that a proponent of (OCE)—the sort of 
content eliminativist who is up for discussion in this section—will never 
use (Non-factualism) in general, or (Content non-factualism) in par­
ticular, to express the view that some sentence has a “non-scientific” 
meaning.
It doesn’t follow, however, that the proponent of (OCE) is not com­
mitted to (CNF). In fact, and on the contrary, a proponent o f (OCE)— 
DevitVssort o f content eliminativist—is very much committed to (CNF)!
For look: A Devittian content eliminativist is someone who denies that 
anything has a robust-truth-conditional or a robust-referential property. 
A fortiori, she denies that the predicate ‘has robust-truth condition p’ 
robustly-refers to a property, and denies that the sentence ‘S has a robust- 
truth condition p’ has a robust-truth condition. She would appear to be 
committed to these claims regardless of what she would or would not call
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them! But these claims just are (CNF). And yet I argued—and Devitt 
accepts—that (CNF) leads to a contradiction.
VII. The Austere Eliminativist
Finally, what about DevitCs “austere eliminativist”—the philosopher 
who “denies that anything is true or false in any sense,"" including a 
deflationary one? (p. 251) As the reader may recall, this position comes 
up in the course of Devitt’s contention that my formulation of the 
general (Error) thesis—construed as a “defect” thesis—begs the question 
against the eliminativist. This claim, of course, rests on the master 
confusion. But we should still ask how the arguments of SOC bear on 
this position, especially as Devitt proclaims that “austere eliminativism is 
coherent and would be left totally untouched by Boghossian’s argument.” 
(p. 251)
The answer is that they bear on it in an especially direct way, as the 
slightest reflection will reveal. The austere eliminativist denies that 
anything is true or false in any sense. So her position is a conjunction of 
claims: nothing is robustly truth-conditional and nothing is deflationarily 
truth-conditional—robust eliminativism and deflationary eliminativism. 
I have just finished showing how the arguments of SOC militate against 
the robust eliminativist. These arguments will, of course, carry over to 
the austere eliminativist. But the austere eliminativist suffers from a 
further problem, a problem generated by the second conjunct in her 
view—that nothing is even deflationarily truth-conditional.
An essential component in my argument against (CNF)—which as we 
saw, Devitt accepts—is the following claim: Denying “truth-condition­
ality” of a declarative sentence only makes sense on a robust under­
standing of “truth-conditional;” on a deflationary conception such a 
claim will always come out false, for on a deflationary conception any 
declarative sentence is automatically truth-conditional. Understanding 
this feature of deflationary truth is a sine qua non of understanding it at 
all. This is a point that is stressed equally by me and Devitt (see his 
discussion of deflationary truth).
But now there would appear to be a transparent problem for the 
deflationary eliminativist. For the deflationary eliminativist denies that 
anything is deflationarily truth-conditional; a fortiori, she denies that 
declarative sentences (‘S has deflationary-truth-condition p,’ ‘Grass is 
green,’ etc.) are deflationarily truth-conditional. But as I argued in SOC 
—and as Devitt accepts—it is impossible for a declarative sentence to fail 
to be deflationarily truth-conditional. So the view looks to be necessarily 
false—the betrayal of a mere confusion about the nature of deflationary 
truth.
THE STATUS OF CONTENT REVISITED 111
VIII. Conclusion
Devitt says that his aim in “Transcendentalism About Content” is to 
show that all arguments to the effect that content eliminativism is un­
stable “are bad, by laying bare the question-begging strategy that is 
common to them.” He would appear to have fallen well short of his aim.
First, even if his criticisms of my paper had not been so off-target, 
I don’t see how his arguments could be counted upon to generalize to 
any conceivable argument to this effect that someone might dream up. 
Could it be that he is being myopic here?
Second, and more importantly, his criticisms of my paper grossly 
misfire. Insofar as he concedes that (RCE) and (CNF) are unstable, he 
concedes the only claim I ever made about them: namely, that those 
particular avenues for expressing content eliminativism are closed. 
Insofar as he criticizes me for inappropriately saddling the content 
eliminativist with these theses, and accuses me of mishandling the idea of 
deflationary truth, he misinterprets me. Insofar as he claims that my 
arguments do not bear on the austere content eliminativist, he both mis­
interprets me and fails to think matters through. Finally, his criticism of 
my argument against the deflationary error thesis is strictly correct, but 
fails to appreciate that all that it calls for is a slight redeployment of the 
argumentative resources of SOC.
SOC posed a challenge to content eliminativists. As far as I am able to 
judge, Devitt’s paper leaves that challenge unanswered. There remain 
many difficult issues in this area and many aspects of the arguments 
I presented that require further discussion. But these matters are best left 
for another occasion.
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, Michigan
NOTES
1 The Philosophical Review, 99 {\99Qi): 157-184.
2 This journal, this issue. All references to Devitt are to this paper.
3 I have had a number of interesting reactions to SOC. My original plan had been to wait 
until a sufficient number of them had come in, and then to respond to some of the more 
important points raised in them in the context of a fuller discussion of the argumentative 
strategies pursued in SOC. DevitCs paper has forced me to depart from my original plan. 
I felt it would be unwise to let such a serious misrepresentation of my paper circulate 
unanswered.
 ̂ Ultimately, nothing really hangs on whether there is or isn’t an objectual way of 
formulating this sort of eliminativism. I don’t know how to do it satisfactorily; nor do 
I know of anyone else who does. So in SOC I followed common custom and formulated it
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metalinguistically. But if the points made toward the end of this paper are sound, not even 
this is strictly needed.
5 Here and below I am following the numbering of SOC.
6 For further discussion see SOC. Just for the record, (2) is not strictly needed for the 
arguments that follow. It would be enough if (Non-factualism) were defined so as to consist 
solely in (1).
This point could have been made directly on (Error) and (Non-factualism) rather than 
on their truth-theoretic variants.
8 Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
1984), p. 43.
9 Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 86.
0̂ Stephen Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1983), pp. 225-226.
A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 1952), 
p. 107.
This deliberately leaves out Devitt’s “austere eliminativist,” the person who denies 
that anything is true or false in any sense, even a deflationary one. It will prove convenient 
to set this marginal position aside for now. It doesn’t affect anything that follows. At the 
end of the paper I will show how it introduces no new issues for the argumentative strategy 
pursued by SOC.
To help make matters as clear as possible, I have introduced the hyphenated predicates, 
“robust-truth” and “deflationary-truth,” and their variants. Here I am following Devitt’s 
recommendation (see his note 17 and pp. 256-257), so this is not something he is in a 
position to object to. However, let me here record my belief that the introduction of such 
predicates, in the present context, is not an unproblematic matter. This is a delicate issue 
that cannot be discussed within the confines of the present essay, and so for the sake of 
expediency, I will suppress any worries on this score.
It’s one of the many mysteries in this area that an objectual eliminativism about 
content should entail a non-factualism about content. This doesn’t happen in the case of 
any other subject matter. It’s one of the many clues we have that our usual expressions of 
irrealism are subject to unexpected twists when they are turned upon the semantic notions 
themselves.
The argument presented here was not properly in focus when I wrote SOC. Certainly my 
presentation in SOC assimilated the discussion of the deflationary error thesis too much to 
the discussion of the robust error thesis. Devitt is right to object that the argument against 
the one won’t work on the other. However, this merely calls for a slight redeployment of 
the argumentative resources of SOC. For prompting me to get clearer about this, I am 
grateful to Devitt’s paper.
For helpful discussion or comments, I am grateful to Paul Horwich, Jerry Fodor, 
Barry Loewer, Jennifer Church, and Mark Kalderon. As always, special thanks to David 
Velleman.
